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Abstract—We present a novel information theoretic approach
to make network coding based storage secure against pollution
attacks in sensor networks. The approach is based on a new
decoding algorithm which makes it possible to find adversarial
blocks using one more encoded block than strictly necessary for
decoding. Our scheme fits well to the requirements of sensor
networks, because it operates with adding very low computational
and communication overhead to source and storage nodes, only
the collector node needs to perform some additional computation.
Our approach does not apply cryptography, hence it works in
environments where no pre-shared keys, secure channels or PKI
are available, which is often the case in sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of network coding [1], [2] has emerging
applications both in the field of wired and wireless networking
[3], [4], as well as in the field of storage systems or peer-to-
peer networks [5], [6]. These systems benefit from coding in
terms of throughput, efficiency, robustness and fault-tolerance.
Here we consider a special application of network coding,
a coding based storage system in sensor networks. In this
system data is produced by multiple source nodes, and is
stored encoded in multiple storage nodes [7], [8], [9], [5].
Storage nodes apply a random linear code on received data.
When a collector node needs to reconstruct the original data,
it obtains encoded data by downloading the content of some
selected storage nodes, and performs decoding. Previous work
show the benefits of the encoded storage system [10], [5].
While network coding has advantages in benign environ-
ments, its performance may seriously fall in the presence of
an adversary [11], [12], [13]. We present a scheme that resists
pollution attacks, meaning that our scheme makes possible
successful decoding even if some compromised nodes store
maliciously modified data. The novelty of our scheme is the
decoding algorithm that allows the collector node to identify
unmodified data blocks using one additional intact block, but
without the need to modify the encoding algorithm or adding
further overhead to the data.
Contrary to cryptographic integrity protection solutions, we
do not require the existence of PKI or secure channels between
the source nodes and the collector. Our scheme exploits the
special properties of sensor storage systems, hence it provides
better applicability in such systems than existing general
pollution attack defense techniques, however, its scope of
applicability may be smaller. Moreover, our solution is the
first practical secure network coding scheme that is applicable
when encoded blocks are composed of blocks originating from
different sources.
The algorithms presented here are based on the principles
introduced in [13]. Here we explore the theoretical limits of
the method and we propose a much more efficient decoding
algorithm than the one in [13].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives
the model of the storage system we assume and defines the
adversary as well. Section III describes the decoding algorithm
we propose, while the properties of the scheme are analyzed
in Section IV. A part of the decoding algorithm, the subspace
search is discussed in Section V. In Section VI we investigate
the performance compared to other solutions. Section VII
gives an overview of related work, while Section VIII con-
cludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We adopt the model of distributed storage for wireless
sensor networks from [5], however our algorithms may be
applicable for other storage systems as well. In this system
data produced by l independent data sources is stored in n
(n > l) storage nodes.
We assume that sources transmit equal size data blocks,
the l sources have data M1,M2, . . .Ml to send. Data blocks
can be parts of a large message, or independent data blocks.
We require that the number m of GF(q) symbols in a data
block be sufficiently large, because, as we will see, this is
an important security parameter of the system. Storage nodes
perform random linear network coding to produce encoded
data blocks (or shortly encoded blocks). The encoding is
performed using a Galois field of size q. Each Mi can be
seen as a vector of length m over GF(q). The encoded
block is a random linear combination computed from the data
blocks [14]. Formally, to produce an encoded block, the ith
storage node selects an encoding vector ei = [ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eil ]
of length l having its elements chosen uniformly at random
from GF(q). The encoded data block is then produced using
these values as coefficients: Ei =
∑l
j=1 eijMj. An encoded
block consists of an encoding vector and the corresponding
encoded data: ei||Ei. Storage nodes select encoding vectors
independently for each encoded data block.
An encoded block ei||Ei is a linear equation, with co-
efficients ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eil and variables M1,M2, . . . ,Ml. We
denote such an equation Zi = (ei, Ei). Without confusing
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the reader, let us also denote by Zi the l + m length vector
Zi =
[
ei, Ei
]
.
In a benign environment, the collector node obtains the
original message by downloading l equations from l randomly
selected storage nodes and by simply solving a system of
linear equations (s.l.e.). As coefficients are chosen randomly,
according to [15], the linear independence of equations holds
with probability
pq =
l∏
i=1
(
1−
1
qi
)
,
which is sufficiently large for a properly chosen field size
q. E.g. if q = 28, l = 10, then pq = 0.996. Our decoding
algorithm described later first finds a set of unmodified (intact)
equations then computes the solution of this intact s.l.e.
The encoded data block is the unit in which the collector
may download data. We do not distinguish random trans-
mission errors and malicious modifications of the transmitted
data. However, common error detection and error correction
techniques applied in the lower layer against channel errors
are assumed to ensure the reception of unmodified blocks as
well. The collector node applies our decoding algorithm to
recover the data sent by the source nodes in a way similar to
decoding of rateless codes.
We further assume that the source nodes and the collector
do not share a key, neither have the possibility to establish a
secure channel.
A. Adversary
We consider an adversary who compromises some selected
storage nodes, and reads and modifies the contents of them.
We do not limit the number of nodes the adversary may
compromise, but note that at least l + 1 intact nodes are
required anyway for successful recovery. By compromising
more nodes the adversary can also increase the error prob-
ability of the decoding. For detailed analysis we refer to
Section IV. We assume the adversary can not compromise
sources, but she may compromise the communication links
between the sources and the selected storage nodes. It gives
more possibility to the adversary, but does not influence the
effect of the attack. The adversary has no information about
the set of nodes from which the collector downloads data.
This model of adversary is realistic in practice, because
contrary to source nodes, storage nodes are exposed to attacks
for an extended period of time.
III. ATTACK-RESILIENT DECODING
The novelty of our scheme is the algorithm of decoding
that assures the attack-resilient property, which is achieved
by using one more encoded block than strictly necessary for
data reconstruction. The order and numbering of blocks are
not relevant, so we number the equations from the collector’s
point of view. Let Z∗i denote the ith block (equation) received
by the collector, either it is from a compromised node or not.
The collector can reconstruct the original blocks if it is able to
collect l linearly independent equations, and if it can be sure,
that all of these l equations are intact.
The main difficulty of the decoding is to find the intact
equations among the received equations. We show, how the
(l+1)-st intact equation is eligible to find the l intact equations
in the received set of encoded equations.
Here we explain the principle of our algorithm. An encoding
vector and the corresponding encoded data form a vector from
the l +m dimensional vector space. Each block, either intact
or adversarial, is a vector from that space. However, intact
and adversarial equations can be distinguished upon whether
they belong to a specific subspace. Decoding exploits the fact
that intact equations span an l dimensional subspace in the
l + m dimensional vector space, because all intact equations
are linear combinations of the same l base equation, which we
get by tagging the ith data block with the ith unit vector as
encoding vector. Each intact equation belongs to that specific
subspace, and each element of this subspace can be treated
as an intact equation. We take advantage of the fact that it is
unlikely that l + 1 vectors taken from the l +m dimensional
space fall into the same l dimensional subspace if they are not
all intact equations. Hence, when l+1 equations that belong to
the same l dimensional subspace are found, it is reasonable to
assume that all these equations are intact. Random coding and
the random order of downloading equations together assure
this property. We further exploit that the (l + 1)-st intact
equation is a linear combination of the formerly received l
equations. We use this idea to find the intact equations in a
set that contains both intact and adversarial equations.
The pseudo-code of the decoding algorithm is presented as
Algorithm 1. The algorithm finds a set S that contains l intact
equations. Equations are received while the rank of matrix
Z, formed by the received equations, increases (lines 5-8).
The (l + 1)-st intact equation certainly does not increase the
rank, because it is a linear combination of the first l intact
equations. If the last received equation does not increase the
rank, we can assume that it is the (l + 1)-st intact equation
received. In this case, the linear combination of all received
equations (coefficient vector λ) that produces the last equation
of the already received equations is computed (line 9). Set S is
formed of the equations that have non-zero coefficient in this
linear combination (lines 10-14). If S has less than l elements,
the last received equation is not innovative and it is dropped
(line 4), and the operation continues (loop of lines 3-15). If S
has exactly l elements, we can assume that the last received
equation is the (l + 1)-st intact equation, and S contains the
first l intact equations received. In this case we return this
set as an intact s.l.e. (lines 16-18). Otherwise, we cannot say
anything about which equations are intact, because intact and
adversarial equations together span the subspace that the last
received equation belongs to, and its dimension is larger than
l. In this case we start searching the proper subspace in the set
of received equations (lines 18-21). We describe the algorithm
of this subspace search later in Section V, but we note that it
is unlikely that an intact equation falls into a subspace that is
not spanned by intact equations only, hence this case happens
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rarely.
Algorithm 1 Decoding
1: download Z∗1
2: let i = 1; Z =
[
Z∗1
]
; S = {}
3: while |S| < l do
4: let Z′ = Z; S = {}
5: repeat
6: download Z∗i+1
7: let i = i+ 1; Z = Z′; Z′ =
[
Z
T Z∗Ti
]T
8: until rank(Z) = rank(Z′)
9: let λ = linsolve(xZ = Zi)
10: for j = 1 to length(λ) do
11: if λj 6= 0 then
12: let S = S ∪ Zj,1...l+m
13: end if
14: end for
15: end while
16: if |S| == l then
17: return S
18: else
19: S = subspace search(Z)
20: return S
21: end if
IV. ANALYSIS
First, we investigate the performance of the decoding algo-
rithm assuming no subspace search is required, and analyze
the subspace search algorithm separately.
a) Security.: Let us assume for a moment that the collec-
tor downloads at most l adversarial blocks. Later we discuss
the cases when this assumption does not hold. The adversary
is successful, if decoding gives an erroneous result, which
happens if the returned set S contains adversarial equations.
From the operation of the algorithm it follows that this can
only happen if the last received equation belongs to an l
dimensional subspace spanned by l not only intact equations.
Let us denote by 〈I〉 the subspace spanned by intact equations
and 〈R〉 the subspace spanned by received equations at the
collector. Figure 1 illustrates the situation.
First, we investigate the case when the last received equation
is intact. The error probability in this case is the probability
that this intact equation belongs to an l dimensional subspace
of 〈R〉. We show that this probability is 0. The last received
equation belongs to 〈I〉 for sure, thus decoding is erroneous,
if the last received intact equation falls into the intersection
of 〈R〉 and 〈I〉. This intersection is a subspace of the l
dimensional subspace of intact equations. Consequently, the
last received equation is a linear combination of the intact
equations received, thus set S contains intact equations only.
If S contains less than l equations the last equation is not
innovative and is dropped, otherwise decoding is successful,
hence the error probability is 0 when the last equation is intact.
We now consider the case, when the last received equation
is not intact. Erroneous result can occur, if the last equation
Fig. 1. Illustration of subspaces
belongs to an l dimensional subspace of 〈I〉 ∪ 〈R〉. We
investigate the probability of this event. Each l size subset of
the received equations spans such a subspace. Recall that the
number t′ of adversarial equations received is at most l. If the
adversary does not know intact equations, adversarial blocks
can be treated as random vectors. In the worst case situation,
l intact and l − 1 adversarial blocks were received before
the lth adversarial block arrives. The probability that the last
adversarial blocks belongs to a specific l dimensional subspace
is 1/qm. If all subspaces were independent, the probability that
it does not belong to any would be (1 − 1/qm)(
r
l), where r
denotes the number of received blocks. Hence an upper bound
for the error probability is:
Perr ≤ 1−
(
1−
1
qm
)(rl)
.
This error probability is practically very small. As an example,
consider q = 28, that is each byte forms exactly one symbol,
let the size m of the encoded data be small, e.g. m = 64, the
number of data blocks l = 100, and assume that the adversary
successfully inserts 99 adversarial blocks. In this case, the
error probability is less than 2−300.
If the adversary can attain intact equations before construct-
ing adversarial blocks, she can enforce incorrect decoding by
selecting adversarial blocks from a subspace that contains the
subspace of eavesdropped equations. Even in this case, due
to the randomness of coefficients, and to the random order
of downloading, at least one dimension of the subspace is
unknown, thus the error probability can not be larger than
1−
(
1− 1
q
)(rl)
. This can be made arbitrarily small by using
a large field size q. Note that this error probability does not
depend on the computational strength of the adversary.
b) Computational cost.: The computational cost of the
decoding is solving two s.l.e.’s in GF(q). One s.l.e. is solved
to identify intact equations (line 9), and another to reconstruct
original data when a set of l intact equations is obtained. Note,
that the computation of the rank does not require additional
effort, because the Gaussian elimination can be performed on
a newly received equation at once. If it results in a zero vector,
the s.l.e. λ[Z] = [Z∗i ] is solved, otherwise the next equation is
received and processed similarly. If not all received equations
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are innovative, and thus line 9 of the decoding algorithm
runs several times, the computational effort does not increase
notably as there is no need to restart the Gaussian elimination
after dropping the last equation.
c) Communication overhead.: The algorithm eventually
stops when the (l+ 1)-st intact equation is received. It means
one encoded block overhead, as l encoded blocks are needed
in any case for successful decoding. If we take encoded blocks
as the unit of coding, it can be proven that no attack detection
or recovery from attack is possible using fewer blocks; in this
sense our scheme is optimal.
Theorem 1. Assuming the described encoding algorithm, no
attack detection or recovery is possible using less than l + 1
intact encoded blocks.
Proof: Having l′ intact encoding vectors, they are con-
sidered as rows of a matrix G of size l × l′. This matrix
determines an (l′, l) linear code applied to the transmitted data
M = [M1,M2, . . .Ml], which is considered as a vector with l
elements. It is known [16] that no error detection or correction
is possible, if the Hamming distance of the code is less than 2.
The linear code G (assuming independent rows) has Hamming
distance more than 1 only if l′ > l, that is at least l+1 intact
encoding vectors are required to form such a matrix G that
corresponds to a code with Hamming distance 2.
This property has importance, because in sensor networks
the communication has high cost. The overhead of our scheme
is thus one additional block, the size of this additional block
is (l +m) log2 q.
d) Error probability.: The main constraint of our scheme
is the limitation on the number of adversarial blocks the
collector may download. If we allow the adversary to com-
promise more than l nodes, l+1 adversarial equations may be
considered as an intact s.l.e. by the collector. In this case it can
not be assured that the collector does not download more than
l adversarial equations. This introduces an error probability
Perror ≤
(
t
l+1
)
(
n−t
l+1
)
+
(
t
l+1
) ,
where n is the number of storage nodes, and t is the number
of compromised nodes. There are at most
(
t
l+1
)
seemingly
intact s.l.e.’s (l + 1 size set of adversarial equations indicated
as intact when decoding) and exactly (n−t
l+1
)
intact s.l.e’s. The
error probability is the ratio between the number of seemingly
intact s.l.e.’s and the number of all intact and seemingly intact
s.l.e.’s. This error probability is practically small, e.g. if n =
50, l = 15, t = 20, then Perror ≈ 3.3 · 10−5.
This error probability can be reduced to 0 if the decoded
data contains authentication information, or with the assump-
tion t < n/2. In the latter case, the following method can
be applied: It can be exploited that the data sent by the
source satisfies at least n/2 equations, while adversarial data
satisfies at most t equations in the system. Using the decoding
algorithm the collector can find a seemingly intact set, and then
substitutes the result into further equations until all together
more than n/2 equations are satisfied. If all equations are
downloaded, but the obtained result fails to satisfy n/2 of
them, the result is erroneous and all equations that this result
satisfies are surely adversarial. After dropping the adversarial
equations, the process can restart until the correct data is
obtained.
V. SUBSPACE-SEARCH
e) Probability of occurrence.: We now discuss the cases
when computing the subspace fails, hence search is required
during decoding (the decoding algorithm runs line 19). This
process is needed if set S contains more than l equations. This
can happen, if the last received equation belongs to a more
than l dimensional subspace spanned by the already received
equations. As we have seen already, this can only happen,
if the last received equation is adversarial. If d equations
are already received, they span
(
d
δ
)
different δ dimensional
subspaces. Applying the same considerations as above, the
probability that an adversarial equation falls into a given δ
dimensional subspace is
Pcl =
1
ql+m−δ
.
This probability can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a
sufficiently large field.
A powerful adversary who can attain several intact equations
can make this probability higher in the following way. She
chooses a δ dimensional subspace from the l+m dimensional
space and selects the adversarial equations from that subspace.
In this case, the dimension of the subspace that received equa-
tions span (the rank of matrix Z) can not be higher than l+ δ.
This attack has significance, if δ ≥ l and the intersection of the
subspace of intact equations and the subspace that adversarial
equations span is not trivial, because, as the algorithm drops
all further adversarial equations as irrelevant equations, the
number of adversarial equations in Z may not increase above
δ, if δ < l. In the following, we assume δ ≥ l. If the dimension
of the intersection is α, the rank eventually stops to increase
after receiving l+δ−α equations, because the dimension of the
subspace that received equations span can not be larger than
l+δ−α. This implies that if there are already l+δ−α equations
received, a newly received equation eventually falls into their
spanned subspace, thus we cannot gain any information of
which equations are intact by solving the s.l.e. of line 9, and
a search of the subspace is required. It follows, that the attack
can force the search with the highest probability if δ is small
and α is large. Of course, δ ≥ l and α ≤ l must hold. If α = l
and δ = l + 1 (δ = l would mean that the adversary inserts
intact equations) and there is at least one adversarial equation
received, subspace search is eventually required.
To perform such an attack the adversary has to be powerful
enough to be able to eavesdrop at least α intact blocks and
combine their contents with her own δ−α equations to produce
the adversarial equations.
Of course, δ is also bounded by the dimension of the
space the equations are selected from, because even if all
adversarial and intact equations are linearly independent, the
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dimension of the spanned subspace can not be larger than
l + m, that is l + δ − α ≤ l + m. Consequently, if there are
l + m already received equations, the next received equation
eventually falls into their spanned subspace without revealing
any information about which equations are intact, and the
search of the subspace is required. It means that if the number
of adversarial equations in Z reaches m, intact equations can
be found only by searching. However, the number of blocks is
usually much less then the size of a block, thus l m holds,
while the adversary is limited to insert l blocks.
Note, that the subspace search process does not effect the
security property of the scheme. The adversary may enforce
the collector to perform the subspace search, but she still
can not compromise the decoded data. It influences only
the computational effort the collector needs for successful
decoding.
f) Algorithm.: An algorithm similar to the recovery pro-
cess proposed in [13] can be applied for subspace search.
The algorithm finds the l + 1 intact equations by exhaustive
search among all received equations. This is done by applying
the same principle as before, that is l + 1 equations that
belong to the same l dimensional subspace are treated as intact
equations. This can be done by checking all possible l+1 size
subsets of the received d equations, whether the rank of the
matrix Z of size (l+1)×(l+m) they form is l. If rank(Z) = l,
the search is ready, Z contains intact equations only. If no such
subset is found, further equations are needed.
Algorithm 2 gives the pseudo-code of subspace search.
Equations are received until the search succeeds (line 4). All
possible l + 1 size subsets of equations are checked whether
they form an l dimensional subspace (lines 6-11). In each
iteration only selections containing the last received equation
are checked to avoid checking the same subset multiple times.
If no such subset is found, a new iteration is performed.
Algorithm 2 Subspace-search
1: let i = number of already received equations
2: while true do
3: let i = i+1
4: download Z∗i
5: let Z′ =
[
Z
T, Z∗Ti
]T
6: for every possible selection S′ of l rows of Z do
7: let S′i =
[
S
′T, Z∗Ti
]T
8: if rank(S′i) = l then
9: let S = {all rows of S′}
10: return S
11: end if
12: end for
13: end while
g) Searching complexity.: Due to the exhaustive search,
the process is computationally expensive. Assume that when
searching starts, Z has d rows, and the algorithm stops when
D equations are received. The last iteration of the algorithm
is not executed fully, on average the half of the subsets needs
to be investigated until the intact set is found. From this it
follows that subspace search requires
1
2
(
D
l
)
+
D−1∑
i=d
(
i
l
)
(1)
rank computations. The function of (1) is exponential in D,
but there are strong reasons to assume that the subspace
search problem is computationally hard, and consequently
it is presumably theoretically impossible to find an efficient
algorithm. The following consideration supports this intuition.
Let us first formalize the problem:
Problem 1. Given a matrix Z of size d× (l + m), with d >
rank(Z) ≥ l + 1, does there exist a vector x having exactly
l + 1 non-zero elements such that xZ = 0?
Here d corresponds to the number of received equations. If
x exists, l+1 rows of Z are found that span an l dimensional
subspace, in other words, these rows form a matrix with rank
l, so the non-zero elements of x indicate intact equations in
Z. The problem refers to one iteration of the algorithm.
From the theory of linear algebra, it is known that the
equation xZ = 0 has many solutions, more precisely, x
belongs to a subspace of dimension β = d− rank(Z)−1. We
consider a basis B of that subspace, consisting of β linearly
independent vectors. Let B be a matrix of size β × d. As B
is a basis of the solution of the equation Zx = 0, any linear
combination of rows of B results in a vector x containing
the coefficients for the equations, for which the corresponding
linear combination results the zero vector. We are interested in
the case when vector x has exactly l + 1 non-zero elements,
consequently Problem 1 is equivalent to the question: Does
there exist a vector c such that cB has exactly l + 1 nonzero
elements?
This is the problem of finding the minimum distance of a
linear code that is known to be NP-complete [17], [18], [19].
h) Accelerated computation.: Although the above rea-
soning implies that we can not hope to find a polynomial-
time algorithm for the subspace search problem, a considerable
acceleration of our proposed algorithm is possible.
The algorithm essentially checks for each possible l + 1
size selection of rows of Z, whether the formed matrix has
full rank. The size of the matrix the computation is performed
on is (l+1)× (l+m). Assuming a large field and a large m,
this may take considerable time. It is possible to get the same
result while working with smaller matrices in the following
way.
We have seen, that we can equivalently investigate the
number of zeros in the product x = cB. To decide if it is
possible to have d−l−1 zeros in x we check for each d−l−1
size selection of elements of x whether they can result all zero
for any vector c. Formally, let pi be a d− l−1 size selection of
d elements. Let us select the columns of matrix B according
to the same selection: Bpi. If the linear equation
cBpi = 0 (2)
70
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25
10−2
10−1
100
101
102
Number of compromised nodes
Ti
m
e 
(s)
 
 
Former recovery algorithm
Our novel decoding algorithm
Fig. 2. Computation times of our decoding algorithm and the former recovery
algorithm of [13]
has a non-trivial solution cpi, vector x = cpiB has at most
l + 1 non-zero elements. If equation (2) does not have non-
trivial solution for any possible selection pi, the iteration is
not successful, further equations are needed. It is known
from linear algebra that equation 2 has non-trivial solution,
if rank(Bpi) < β. This method requires the same number(
d
d−l−1
)
=
(
d
l+1
)
of matrix rank computations as before, but
the size of matrix Bpi is only β×(d−l−1), which substantially
accelerates computation. The computation of matrix B is
efficient, it is equivalent to solving a s.l.e.
VI. PERFORMANCE
i) Computation.: Although the subspace search is com-
putationally expensive, it does not affect the performance of
the scheme when the adversary has limited capabilities, and
despite the high complexity it remains in the domain of fea-
sibility in many other practical cases as well. For comparison
we implemented both the recovery algorithm presented in
[13] and the novel decoding algorithm. The complexity of the
novel algorithm is polynomial in the majority of the cases,
and still remains in the domain of feasibility when the former
algorithm becomes computationally expensive. Figure 2 shows
an example result of the comparison. The computation was
performed on a 2.6 GHz desktop computer and in Matlab
environment. The parameter setting of the presented figure
is n = 100, l = 10, q = 28, m = 1000, and a worst-case
adversary was assumed: δ = l+ 1, α = l. It is clear from the
figure that the novel algorithm operates with smaller deviation
and remains feasible in the case of stronger attacks as well.
j) Communication.: We present a comparison of the
communication overhead of our scheme and an alternate
scheme using digital signatures. However, note that using
digital signatures introduces additional overhead, that we do
not consider here. For the digital signature scheme, we assume
that the size in bits of the signature is s, and that on average
p (p > 1) equations need to be downloaded to get an intact
equation. Source nodes send their raw data to γ storage nodes
out of the n available nodes, where γ = 5(n/l) ln(l) to
ensure successful decoding [5]. The overall overhead is then
lγs + lps bytes, where the first term corresponds to the
overhead of transmitting raw data to the storage nodes, while
the second term refers to the additionally downloaded bytes
when reconstructing data.
Our encoding scheme requires one more intact equation to
download, so the overhead is pL, where L is the bitlength
of one packet: L = (l + m) log2 q. From this it follows, that
the overhead of our coding scheme is less than that of digital
signatures if L < l
(
s+ γs
p
)
. E.g. if s = 40 bytes, n = 50,
l = 15, p = 1.8, our scheme performs better than the signature
based solution if L < 15600 bytes. The typical size of sensor
data is much smaller than this value. In larger systems this
threshold further increases. Furthermore, in our scheme source
nodes do not have any overhead, only the collector node does,
but that node is often a powerful base station.
VII. RELATED WORK
Securing network coding based systems has two main ap-
proaches: information theoretic and cryptographic. A summary
of network coding related security threats and solutions is
available in [20]. First we show some information theoretic
results. In [21] a rate-optimal code is introduced for securing
network coding. In that scheme redundant bits are added to
the sent data, and decoding relies either on a secure channel
or on publicly known information. The authors of [21] assume
a more general adversary, and allow adversarial blocks to be
encoded together with intact ones. Our scheme is less general,
instead it is tailored for the requirements of sensor networks.
It does not need secure channels or public information, and
contrary to the encoding of [21] it can be applied when there
are more than one sources. The same holds for the error
correction encoding scheme of [22]
The most similar approaches to the one presented here are
[23] and [13]. However, [23] proposes only an attack detection
scheme. We introduce a more efficient decoding algorithm
than in [13], and give a more in-depth analysis of the problem.
The other possible approach is to apply cryptography for
securing coding based systems. Cryptographic functions ap-
plied to encoded data need to have homomorphic property,
which means that a hash value or a digital signature of an
encoded block can be computed from the corresponding values
computed on raw data. The verification of an encoded block is
similar to the uncoded case. The advantage of cryptographic
solutions is that blocks can be verified one by one, while
our scheme can verify blocks only when decoding becomes
possible.
In the case of homomorphic hash function, the collector
computes the hash value of the encoded block from the
hashes of raw data received through a secure channel from the
sources. It also computes the hash of the received block, and
if the two values match, the block is verified. Homomorphic
hash functions are proposed in [24] and in [25]. The drawback
of these schemes is that they are computationally expensive,
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and they require a secure channel between the sources and the
collector. We do not assume such secure channel.
For the homomorphic digital signatures [26], [27], [28],
[29], [30] the source (or intermediate nodes) can construct
a valid signature on the encoded block using the signatures of
the raw data without accessing the private key. The verification
of the signature is possible for the collector in the usual way,
assuming a PKI is available. As we have seen, digital signa-
tures require per block overhead and additional computations
at both the source and the collector. Moreover, if there are
multiple sources in the system - as in our applied model -
all source have to use the same signing key, that introduces a
difficult key management problem.
VIII. SUMMARY
We proposed a novel decoding algorithm for coding based
sensor storage that is able to correctly decode original data
even if some encoded blocks are maliciously modified or
inserted by an adversary. Our scheme does not require any
modification at the sources or storage nodes, instead the
collector uses one additional block by decoding. The decoding
algorithm has linear complexity in most cases, however a
powerful adversary has a chance to force more costly op-
erations at the collector. We investigated the probability and
the computational complexity of this latter case. By carefully
selecting the parameters, the probability of computationally
hard operations can be made sufficiently small in practice
(≤ 1
qx
, where q is the field size of network coding and x
is at least 1).
The security analysis shows that, with proper parameters,
the scheme is at least as secure as cryptographic approaches.
Not using cryptography, our scheme does not rely on the
existence of a PKI or a secure channel.
Our scheme is developed applicable in sensor networks in
the first place, but other storage systems like peer-to-peer
content sharing may also benefit from it. Performance analysis
results confirms that the scheme is applicable in practice. This
method is the first attempt that gives practical security solution
for a multi-source network coding scenario.
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